A Confluence of Authority and Critique by Kaiser, H Archibald
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 19 Issue 1 Article 7 
4-1-1996 
A Confluence of Authority and Critique 
H Archibald Kaiser 
Dalhousie University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
H Archibald Kaiser, "A Confluence of Authority and Critique" (1996) 19:1 Dal LJ 198. 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Critical Notice
H. Archibald Kaiser* A Confluence of Authority
and Critique
[Review of The Law of Homicide, by Christine Boyle, Isabel Grant &
Dorothy Chunn, (Toronto: Carswell, 1994).]'
It is a measure of my enthusiasm for the scholarship of the authors of this
rich new text that I responded with uncharacteristic ardour to the request
to write a review. In fact, at first I rather lost track of the approach to its
grisly subject matter which a legal text must take, recalling instead
George Orwell's evocative portrayal of the use of stories about murder as
recreation:
It is Sunday afternoon... You put your feet up on the sofa, settle your
spectacles on your nose, and open the News of the World. [A delicious meal
has] put you in just the right mood. Your pipe is drawing sweetly, the sofa
cushions are soft underneath you, the fire is well alight, the air is warm and
stagnant. In these blissful circumstances, what is it that you want to read
about?
Naturally, about a murder.2
Reading about murder in the news, seeing it portrayed on the long-
running British television series Inspector Morse, or pondering it as one
digests Crime and Punishment are in many ways far preferable to
studying, teaching or practising the law of homicide. After a few chapters,
and particularly following my re-immersion into the cold substantive law
of homicide which commences in chapter 3, one is certainly reminded
that this is not a work to read as a pastime in "blissful circumstances". It
is, nonetheless, a remarkably good book in terms of its breadth, authority
and originality in approach and substance. It marks a point of some
maturation in Canadian legal scholarship in several senses. It presents a
comprehensive discussion of the most serious of crimes, long the subject
of the treatise writer, but its looseleaf format permits a regular updating
of the law as Parliament and the courts contribute to its evolution in the
* Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. The Law of Homicide is available both as a softcover text (448 pp.) and an updatable
looseleaf version.
2. George Orwell, "Decline of the English Murder", in Decline of the English Murder and
Other Essays (Penguin, 1968) at 9.
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post-Charter3 era. Thinking back on my review of another recent publi-
cation, Don Stuart's Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law,4 I
recalled my analysis of the utility of writing a conventional book in these
times:
My conclusion on the matter of currency of this book is that it may no
longer be possible or useful to write other than a looseleaf volume, which
purports to state the law "as of ... " such is the rate of change.5
Here the authors have wisely chosen to provide a regular updating
service, which will help to avoid the now ominous spectre for Canadian
authors of what one writes today being out-of-date tomorrow. Indeed,
between the time I started preparing this review (September, 1995) and
the time when I was able to finally concentrate upon it (January, 1996),
the authors were kind enough to send me the revisions for the 1995 edition
to chapters 3, 4 and 5, so that some of the comments I might earlier have
made have been eclipsed. Even so, some juridical events occurred after
their forwarding of these chapters and the others had not yet been sent
to me.
The book is also noteworthy in Canadian scholarship for what it
represents in other ways. It is a collaborative effort, representing the work
of three prolific women scholars. The authors are consistent in their
emphasis on understanding "issues relating to the sexual politics of
homicide. ' 6 They are concerned to explore how the law should "respond
to the use of homicide as a mechanism for controlling women?"7 This
candid dedication to portraying the law of homicide from a feminist
perspective is surely to be welcomed in an atmosphere where legal texts
often pose as presenting only black letter law from a value neutral stance.
One hopes that the book will enjoy a circulation commensurate with its
quality, but in addition its widespread use would contribute to the
prospects of a shift within the criminal bar away from its patriarchal
anchors. As recently as ten years ago one would have thought the chances
of putting together such a major treatise with an avowedly feminist slant,
getting it published and eventually seeing it relied upon by the profession,
were slim. Perhaps the times are changing (and not a moment too soon).
I always have some reservations about offence specific books. Al-
though they may be of interest to the practitioner who has a case arising
3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
4. D. Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, (Toronto: Carswell, 1991).
5. H. Archibald Kaiser, "Keeping up with Criminal Law in Post-Charter Canada", Reviewing
ibid. vol. 5, 1 (1994), Criminal Law Forum 105 at 107.
6. Supra note 1 at vi.
7. Ibid.
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from the particular subject-matter, these works seldom provide the site
for discussion and speculation on the classical themes of criminal justice.
Fortunately, the special nature of homicide provides what is otherwise
missing from such books. Homicide cases are typically litigated by senior
practitioners, before trial judges who are relatively scrupulous in their
discussion of the facts and the law for the jury and are then considered by
successive appellate courts. The offence therefore provides what theft or
assault may not, a body of facts and law that is given the highest level of
attention by the legal system.
The book is unique in terms of its concentration on the law of homicide
in Canada. Other works have canvassed the same field, indeed for
hundreds of years, but homicide has never been quite as exhaustively
presented in Canada. One might well ask if anything new is added by this
text. In examining Dalhousie's collection of rare books on the subject, I
was quickly made aware that many of the basic issues the authors explore
are certainly timeless. For example, I read a fragile original text from
1773 which considered many of the same aspects of homicide:
The proper distinction [between manslaughter and murder] to be observed
is, when the intention of killing is not necessarily implied in the act itself;
as when a man strikes another merely with his hand, or fist, in sudden
anger; or thrusts him suddenly from him, whereby he falls and receives a
hurt, which occasions death; in these and similar cases, the striking, or
thrusting is, indeed, voluntary, yet the killing or manslaughter is not so, but
entirely undesigned and unexpected; which proper and necessary distinc-
tion the Law Commentators have unhappily neglected. For, though the act
of striking or thrusting in anger bears some resemblance to malice, and
though such act is certainly unlawful in itself, yet it is reasonable to make
some allowance for the frailty of human nature, and the sudden passion of
a man that is provoked, whenever a more criminal malice is not necessarily
implied in the act itself, which occasions death.8
Sharp's short work not only addressed many of the same problems, but
did so with the same dedication as these authors. He tried to analyze the
origins of some of the existing doctrines of law, showing where the
commentators and jurists had erred, focusing on the phenomenon of
duelling, which he maintained was too often seen as a lesser homicide,
when to him it was clearly murder. For the most part, the authors of The
Law of Homicide are similarly rigorous in their analysis of the modem
incarnations of homicide, seldom content to accept the status quo without
carefully scrutinizing its origins and its implications.
8. G. Sharp, Remarks on the Opinions of Some of the Most Celebrated Writers on Crown Law,
Respecting the Due Distinction between Manslaughter and Murder (London: White and
Horsefield, 1773) at 26-27.
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In its consciousness of the relationship of gender and homicide, and to
a lesser extent such other influences as sexual orientation and race, the
book demands a re-examination of the common wisdom. It does so in a
manner which is challenging, but never arrogantly dismissive of existing
jurisprudence. Its reach could be extended in many areas, but this is a
relatively minor criticism of such an ambitious book. For example,
subsequent editions might well be as sensitive to other relevant factors
such as mental disability or social class, points of view which have not
infused the rest of the work to the same extent as the aforementioned
factors. Similarly, the authors decided to avoid a thorough discussion of
other related topics, such as war crimes and homicide by corporations,
although both types of killing and the authors' rationale for not covering
them are briefly mentioned.
I believe that the usefulness of the work would have been improved had
there been a bibliography organized by subject. As it stands, it is
copiously footnoted and has a comprehensive table of cases, but a topical
consolidation would be extremely helpful, particularly of the secondary
sources referred to. Subsequent editions might contemplate providing
more tactical, strategic and generally professional advice for the criminal
practitioner, who is, after all, its intended audience. Even acknowledging
that the book deals with the law of homicide, there is still room for
additional levels of guidance for the lawyer, judge or legislator dealing
with these issues. One would not want the book to fundamentally change
its character, but when examining shorter and less doctrinally weighty
works, such as Defending Mentally Disordered Persons (1995),9 one sees
the contribution to a practitioner's life that a book can offer. This type of
material could be either a companion piece, an additional chapter, or
integrated into the existing text.
More fundamental for subsequent editions is the authors' working
through some of the conundrums raised by their outlook on many aspects
of the elements of offences and defences. Thus, for example, the authors
say that they "have tried to pay attention to what might be termed
'equality' issues, focusing, for instance, on questions on the relevance of
race, gender, economic power, and mental disability in the development
of legal doctrine", 0 yet they also argue for a retention of the mandatory
minimum sentence for murder," the difficulties of which are examined
in this review. Perhaps these and other positions, set forth in their
9. H. Bloom & R.T. Butler, Defending Mentally Disordered Persons (1995) (Toronto:
Carswell, 1995).
10. Supra note 1 at 7-91.
l1. Ibid. at 7-55.
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"Conclusions" need to be re-examined. These authors have demonstrated
a sufficient grasp of the moral, political and legal dilemmas inherent in
the current legal structure regarding homicide to entitle them to offer
some overarching theory of crime and punishment (or some alternative
to the current punitive response to anti-social behaviour). It may be that
they have already reached their positions after sufficient thought and I am
merely disagreeing with some of them, such as the mandatory minimum
sentence for murder, but as I point out later, the book would benefit from
extended conclusions. Given the symbolic significance and legal influ-
ence of any discussion of murder, the overall effect of this work might
then reverberate beyond its concentration on homicide.
Most of the balance of this review will be occupied by discussion of
portions of the individual chapters and will therefore be more specific.
For any book that is to be taken seriously, this has always seemed to me
to be an important part of the reviewer's responsibilities, to not only
critically evaluate the book, but to actually convey in some form or other
what the authors have said. Although I and others may take issue with
some of their perspectives on occasion, nothing in this review should be
seen as diminishing this author's admiration for this singular achieve-
ment in Canadian criminal law.
In the Preface, the authors set forth their ambitious agenda: "to provide
legal practitioners with an analysis of the criminal law relating to
homicide in Canada." 2 The book omits few major questions in Canadian
law with respect to homicide although, of course, it is possible that
subsequent editions may pick up some of the themes that the authors have
chosen to ignore. Therefore, the work does contemplate the major
criminal offences, such as murder, manslaughter, infanticide, attempts
and causing death by criminal negligence. On the other hand, there are
killings which are given less coverage in the book, in part because they
have been largely neglected by legislators, investigators and courts, such
as death caused by the workplace or dangerous products. The authors
have demonstrated in the first two chapters (and interspersed throughout)
that they do have a grasp of the many levels of analysis which should be
engaged in to achieve a full understanding of their topic. The express
orientation of the book towards legal practitioners may mean that some
of the authors' more challenging perspectives are either not included in
the book or are given short shrift. Therefore, one might have wanted them
to be more specific in their analysis of "the use of homicide as a
12. Ibid. at v.
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mechanism for controlling women"' 3 or the extent to which "the criminal
law [should] be used to deter business decisions which put lives at risk". 4
If subsequent editions of the book do not contemplate more explicitly
these and other issues which are regrettably unconventional for a legal
text, one hopes the authors will continue their writing in the field in other
publications.
Chapter 1, "The Social Reality of Homicide", is relatively unusual in
a book ostensibly examining a single type of offence from a substantive
perspective. Rather than immediately leaping into the elements and
available defences, the authors have chosen to deal with very fundamen-
tal questions about the nature of homicide in Canada. Following a brief
definitional discussion, killing is presented as another aspect of deviant
behaviour which is "a relativistic, socially-constructed phenomenon; a
shifting set of labels or statuses which reflects the priorities and interests
of more powerful individuals and groups in a society at a given mo-
ment."'5 This level of understanding leads the authors to discuss the
"gendered nature of killings."'16 The chapter goes on to provide an
illuminating survey of the "Demographics of Homicide", highlighting
the fact that "non-culpable homicides far outnumber culpable killings"'7
in Canada, that the "average" homicide perpetrator "usually kills some-
one like himself and someone he knows", 8 and that there are some
startling anomalies in the phenomenon of homicide, such as the dramatic
overrepresentation of Aboriginal peoples among homicide perpetrators
and victims. Finally, the chapter recognizes that the "legal definitions of
homicide"'19 inevitably cause the "focus on some offences and offenders
rather than others",2" decisions which are viewed as "not only political but
also ideological in nature."12' One might well wonder what the practitio-
ner, to whom the book is dedicated, is going to do with information such
as this, but this portion of the text should not be dismissed as being too
arcane. Lawyers ought to have a clearer conception of the social context
of the offences in which they become involved. There might even be an
independent practical benefit to this analysis, perhaps with respect to the
sentencing process, parole applications or attempts at influencing the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
13. Ibid. at vi.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. at 1-2.
16. Ibid. at 1-4.
17. Ibid. at 1-9.
18. Ibid. at I-11.
19. Ibid. at 1-17.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
204 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Chapter 2, "Criminological Theories of Homicide", continues in this
remarkable and expansive tradition. In reviewing the classical, positivist,
critical and feminist schools of criminology, the authors reveal different
answers to some key questions:
Why is (culpable) homicide so overwhelming a lower-class male phenom-
enon? Do we need sex-specific theories of homicide? What accounts for
the disproportionate number of homicide perpetrators from racial and
ethnic minorities?
22
This meta-explanation enables one to stand outside hegemonic accounts
of homicide so that in accepting the dominant explanation, one under-
stands that it is a choice, rather than a necessity to rely upon assumptions
such as universal and equal rationality in examining homicide. Given the
grounding of Canadian criminal law in variations of the classical or
positivist models, one might again ask about the utility of this interesting
and authoritative synthesis in this chapter for the practitioner. While the
courtroom is an unlikely venue for a direct debate among causal theories,
it is nonetheless possible to construct arguments either in the pre-
adjudicative or sentencing stages of a criminal trial which borrow from
the range of explanatory theories presented in this chapter. To illustrate,
it might be useful for counsel to try to establish how his or her client fits
in with common paradigms and related explanatory frameworks for a
particular type of killer, such as the woman who kills a child, and who
therefore does not fit into the usual "assumptions" that all women are
"natural" mothers and no "normal woman could possibly commit such a
horrific act."23
Chapter 3 reviews the common elements of all culpable homicides,
starting with some remarks on the boundaries of "human" for purposes
of determining homicide. The following section canvasses ways of
determining whether death has occurred and particularly addresses the
potential conflict between a bio-medical perspective and legal definition
on the cessation of life. The authors point out that for determinations of
death and other issues such as causation, different interpretive routes may
be taken depending upon whether one is concentrating upon subjective
culpability of the accused or the harm caused by the accused.24 Although
they observe that "the Canadian criminal justice system has traditionally
opted for a mixture of the culpability and harm approaches but without
much reflection on the appropriate balance",25 it is not at all clear whether
22. Ibid. at 2-1.
23. Ibid. at 2-19.
24. Ibid. at 3-17.
25. Ibid. at 3-18.
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there is a way of reaching a conceptual balance which will be helpful in
all, or even most, contexts. The authors do include a helpful discussion
of reform options both here and in most other parts of the book, so that the
lawyer should be well aware of the possibilities of development in the
area, whether in common law settings or through legislative activity.
The chapter also considers the many thorny issues involved in causa-
tion of a death. Although as a law teacher I enjoy presenting these
problems because of their complexity, the irreconcilability of the cases
and the interrelationship with fault, the percentage of cases where the
interpretation of causation actually matters to an accused must be small
indeed. The authors observe that " [o] ften, the causal connection between
an accused's act (or omission) in a death will be obvious", 26 but beyond
this, one is left to wonder about the opportunity cost of so many Canadian
legal scholars anxiously pondering a legislative or curial solution to
causation issues in the literature. While synthesizing this extensive
scholarship very competently, the authors do manage to contribute some
insightful suggestions. For example, they propose that "it is not self-
evident that the causation test for manslaughter should be more relaxed
than that for murder",27 arguing that "one could see this issue in precisely
the opposite way and argue that, because we require such a high degree
of fault for murder, a rigorous causation test is not necessary. '28 The
chapter concludes with a discussion of some reform options, although it
does not mention such documents as the Report of the Sub-Committee of
the House of Commons 29 or the June 28, 1993 White Paper,30 both of
which were released after the 1992 Canadian Bar Association proposals
which the book does note.
Liability for killing by omission is acknowledged as a substantive
issue arising with other offences. 31 Their review of general principles and
specific cases is, as always, thorough, although at times one feels that the
authors speak with sufficient authority to permit them to suggest their
conclusion sooner, that most forms of culpable homicide can be commit-
ted by omission. Similarly, although the authors have provided an
26. Ibid. at 3-20.
27. Ibid. at 3-39.
28. Ibid.
29. Blaine Thacker, Chair, First Principles: Recodifying the General Part of the Criminal
Code of Canada, Report of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General Part of the
Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (February,
1993).
30. Proposals to amend the Criminal Code (general principles), The Minister of Justice of
Canada, June 28, 1993 (draft bill). There are also accompanying Ministerial Speaking Notes
released in Justice Information on the same date.
31. Supra note 1 at 3-51.
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argument "in favour of holding corporations responsible for culpable
homicides"3 2 they need not have been quite so painstaking in pointing to
their conclusion. On the other hand, it is perhaps this reviewer's funda-
mental concurrence with at least these major propositions that motivates
a tolerance of less thoroughness. Given the possible influence of such a
comprehensive work, the authors' devotion to detail is not so much a
criticism as an observation that they have captured what may be a policy
consensus on many major issues in homicide.
In chapter 4, the book commences with a quick recommendation for
the dispatch of the "Year and a Day" rule as well as the anachronistic
declaration that homicide cannot be committed "(a) by any influence on
the mind alone".33 The chapter continues with an analysis of the actus
reus of unlawful act manslaughter, which the authors conclude could be
that of "any unlawful act (from provincial absolute liability offences to
federal mens rea offences) causing death",34 as long as the fault require-
ment for the unlawful act is at least "a marked departure... plus the fault
requirement for the consequence of death",35 which would "permit such
provincial offences as breaches of health and safety legislation to be
included as unlawful acts".36 In this and other portions of the book the
authors seem to be gravitating fairly consistently to a tolerance or
encouragement of the expansion of the boundaries of culpable homicide,
grounded in an acknowledgement of the harm caused in this crime, rather
than in more individualistic assessments of culpability. They are prob-
ably not breaking any new ground here. The authors seem to share the
perspective in Creighton,37 that a marked departure from the standard of
the reasonable person is required to sustain a conviction for unlawful act
manslaughter, although they review the issues of what one uses as the
"base line level of care"38 and the extent to which an accused must fall
below the standard which has been established.
The book examines the issue of "whether the deliberate assaulter, but
accidental killer, could be convicted of manslaughter [arguing that] it
would be unfair to convict the accidental killer of manslaughter",3 9 a
perspective which appears to be somewhat inconsistent with their will-
ingness to push the limits of culpable homicide with respect to other
32. [bid. at 3-70.
33. Section 228 of the Criminal Code.
34. Supra note 1 at 4-15.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3.
38. Supra note 1 at 4-17.
39. Supra note 1 at 4-20.
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elements of manslaughter. On the other hand, the authors do want to
provide some control over the criminal sanction in homicide, which they
see the Supreme Court as having demanded in a foreseeability of bodily
harm which is neither trivial nor transitory, rather than a foreseeability of
death.4 0 The chapter then dissects culpable homicide by criminal negli-
gence, concentrating on the offences of manslaughter by criminal negli-
gence and causing death by criminal negligence.
The authors lament the failure of the Supreme Court to explicitly
define "wanton or reckless disregard", 41 although they observe that
"current Canadian law is leaning toward, or even has already adopted, an
objective test [which is] consistent with the balance of authority in the
Commonwealth generally."42 The subsection contains an argument for
bringing "to the surface of judicial analysis"43 "such assumptions about
social utility and the appropriate scope of manslaughter",4 as seem to be
implicit in judgments construing disregard for the lives or safety of other
persons, where there is some tacit assumption that "some activities are
socially useful and, therefore, should not attract criminal liability for a
homicide." 5 The chapter also ponders issues regarding the compara-
tively rare problems of the homicide being caused by threats or wilfully
frightening a person.
The book considers murder, noting that although it is "now virtually
taken for granted", 46 "the use of the mental state as the determining factor
between the two crimes [of murder and manslaughter] is not self-
evident. '47 A section of the chapter is devoted to the distinction between
the actual intention and recklessness strains of liability under s. 229 of the
Criminal Code,48 in which the authors note the difficulty in drawing a line
between foresight of substantial certainty of death (equivalent to inten-
tion after R. v. Buzzanga49) and knowledge of a likelihood or probability
of death, constituting recklessness.50 If the accused had a belief that the
death was possible only, although not likely, a conviction for manslaugh-
ter is the only available verdict. The authors argue that "intention should
extend to someone who knows that his or her actions will cause death,
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. at 4-25.
42. Ibid. at 4-27.
43. Ibid. at 4-28.
44. Ibid. at 4-28.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid. at 4-34.
47. Ibid.
48. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter Code].
49. R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.).
50. Supra note I at 4-40.
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even if that is not the actor's primary purpose for acting."'" They expand
upon the distinctions between "likelihood" and "possibility" later in the
chapter, approving the approach in R. v. Piri,5 2 in which the New Zealand
Court of Appeal took the approach that "a fine calculation that the odds
were against it, although the risk was plainly there, is no defence."53
Sections 229(b) ("by accident or mistake causes death to another human
being, notwithstanding that he does not mean to cause death or bodily
harm to that human being") and 229(c) ("where a person, for an unlawful
object, does anything that he knows or ought to know is likely to cause
death, and thereby causes death") are discussed as well. The difficulty of
analyzing these subsections after several recent decisions from the
Supreme Court provides a forceful argument for the reformulation of the
homicide provisions in a manner that would eliminate overlap and
uncertainty.
Section 230 of the Code,54 the constructive murder provision, is
unconstitutional as a result of several decisions, although it remains in the
Code.55 The authors do set out how the section operated in order to
provide a foundation for their subsequent presentation of the various
Supreme Court of Canada cases.
The book elucidates the constitutional dimensions of fault represented
by the Vaillancourt56 and Martineau57 decisions, explaining the reluc-
tance of the Court to extend the insistence upon subjective foresight of
death to the other homicide provisions. The result of judicial decisions in
the area is acceptable to the authors, because it has "produced a defensible
structure ... [with] an offence of murder which is tilted toward an
emphasis on culpability ... in addition to a less serious offence of
manslaughter tilted towards the recognition of the harm in causing death
and oriented toward encouraging people to take care to avoid causing that
harm.
' 58
There is an extensive treatment of the impact of the Charter on various
types of defences: those that involve a challenge to the objective compo-
nent of a defence that relates to an element of the offence; those that
concern an objective component of an excusing orjustifying defence; and
those that would address limiting conditions on existing defences, other
51. Ibid. at4-41.
52. [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 66 (C.A.).
53. Ibid. at 78.
54. Supra note 48.
55. Ibid.
56. R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636.
57. R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
58. Supra note 1 at 4-69.
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than objective standards in the application of defences. In addition, "the
Charter could be used to challenge the removal of a defence in the context
of homicide",59 in response to which the authors specifically consider
s. 33.1 of the Code' introduced through Bill C-72 as a response to the
Daviault' decision on extreme intoxication in general intent offences. In
the end, the authors plead for caution as courts evaluate such legislative
attempts to limit defences, recognizing that
[w]hile adequate concern must be given to protecting the liberty interests
of the accused, it must also be recognized that limiting conditions on
defences serve the purpose of providing limits on when violence will be
tolerated and, as such, of providing more protection for the victims of
violence.
62
The book relates the obstacles in trying to give retroactive effect to
Vaillancourt63/Martineau4 type developments, where a court has invali-
dated a criminal provision, specifically here in the context of s. 230. The
reluctance of the courts to intervene and give full effect to their decisions
should not frustrate the pursuit of justice. They concur in Professor
Manson's suggestion that "the Royal prerogative of mercy should be used
to deal with those offenders for whom the mandatory period of parole and
eligibility is excessive. 65 With the recent establishment of the Self
Defence Review chaired by Judge Ratushny to investigate those cases of
women convicted of homicide who might have benefited from an
application of Lavallie 66 or like decisions, there is now a firm precedent
for both the initial use of such mechanisms and a procedure which may
be employed. In subsequent editions, the book should develop sugges-
tions as to how this approach was reached in that context, as well as how
one might lobby for it in others, together with a discussion of the eventual
actual findings and recommendations of the investigator, as this route
should become part of the practitioner's armoury.
59. Ibid. at 4-72.
60. Supra note 48.
61. R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
62. Supra note I at 4-75-76.
63. Supra note 56.
64. Supra note 57.
65. Supra note t at 4-77.
66. R. v. Laval[e, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852. The Terms of Reference of the Self Defence Review
acknowledge that "there have been developments in our understanding of the law of self-
defence as it relates to battered women who have been involved in abusive relationships."
Judge Ratushny is empowered, inter alia, "to make recommendations in appropriate cases to
the Government of Canada for individual women whose circumstances merit consideration for
the granting of royal prerogative of mercy." Department of Justice, SelfDefence Review: Terms
of Reference (Canada: October 4, 1995) [on file with Author].
210 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The authors present a consolidation of reform proposals for the law of
murder, as well as their own recommendations, which would in the main
simplify the crime to be that of:
Any act or omission, done with the intent to kill a human being (or
recklessness with respect to death) which does kill, should be sufficient for
murder and there is no further need to inquire into whether there was an
unlawful act, criminal negligence, etc. The definition of murder should
include express reference to the possibility of murder by omission where
there is a duty to act. We support a definition of murder that includes
intentional murder and reckless murder.
Meaning to kill, or knowing that one is almost certainly going to kill,
should constitute intentional murder.67
The underpinnings of the crime of infanticide are critically examined
and, while the authors note that "it is difficult to draw any conclusion from
the conflicting literature about the extent to which medical and social
factors influence postpartum disorders", 68 they ask some fundamental
questions about the apparent premise of the law, "that women who kill
their children while suffering from such a condition should be treated as
a special category of offender. '69 The authors note that without the
offence-creating provision of s. 233, "a woman who wilfully killed her
newborn would be charged with murder, or at least manslaughter"70 and
therefore the section has the effect of offering a defence. Although the
authors identify many levels of difficulty with respect to the crime of
infanticide, including the application of prosecutorial discretion and
constitutionality, they conclude by saying that "the offence of infanticide
is constitutional", based upon their recognition of the "unique pressures
and strains faced by a new mother that have no equivalent in new
fathers."'" The authors believe that trying for murder a woman who kills
her newly-born child is too harsh.72 The options they canvass include
abolition of the offence, with the result that such women would be
charged with murder or manslaughter, although there is some equivoca-
tion as to the applicability of the mental disorder defence in such
circumstances. A second possibility would be to permit a defence of
diminished responsibility, which recognizes the transitory nature of
postpartum disorders. The third option reviewed "would be to abolish the
offense of infanticide and to enact a defence related to postpartum
67. Supra note 1 at 4-78.
68. Ibid. at 4-87.
69. Ibid. at 4-85.
70. Ibid. at 4-89.
71. Ibid. at 4-98.
72. Ibid. at4-101.
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disorders."73 This recommendation strikes one as being highly unusual,
given that it would raise one particular disorder to a position of promi-
nence, when there are many variations of mental disability which affect
new mothers and others.
In considering the implications of retention and abolition of this crime,
the authors observe that the former option connects reproduction and
criminality and signals compassion, while the latter suggests that mothers
who kill their newly born children would be held just as responsible as
anyone else. Although Crown discretion is recognized as a way of
avoiding these alternatives, it would seem that it is just as compatible a
method of confronting some of the essential dilemmas to merely elimi-
nate the minimum penalty for murder, thereby preserving judicial discre-
tion in sentencing, which could contemplate everything from evidence of
disorder which did not satisfy the mental disorder prerequisites, to social,
economic and physiological factors which were relevant in the commis-
sion of the offence. At various places in the book, this difficulty of a
sentencing structure setting the stage for the substantive framework is
noted. For example, at the beginning of s. 6.11, "Diminished Responsi-
bility", the authors observe that "like other defences to murder, the
doctrine developed largely as a result of the inflexible sentencing struc-
ture for murder."74 A similar observation occurs in the sentencing
section.
75
Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of s. 21(1) of the Code76 which
makes the actual committer as well as any aider and abetter, culpable
parties to an offence. The section reviews the basic elements of party
liability, clarifying the actus reus/mens rea distinction with regard to
murder and manslaughter and explaining the possibility of a party being
guilty of a different form of homicide from the principal offender. The
section evinces a clear understanding of the effect of s. 21(2) of the
Code,77 which deals with the situation where two or more individuals
agree to commit an offence and one of them commits a further offence.
The various combinations of liability particularly in the wake of the
Martineau78 and Creighton79 decisions are fully canvassed.
73. Ibid. at4-102.
74. Ibid. at 6-122.
75. Ibid. at 7-54.
76. Supra note 48.
77. Supra note 48.
78. Supra note 57.
79. Supra note 37.
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There is a succinct but accurate discussion of the rarely used s. 22(1)
of the Code,8" which punishes as a party one who counsels the commis-
sion of an offence. As in other instances, the authors explain their
interpretation of the law clearly and demonstrate their willingness to
tolerate a conviction in a wide variety of circumstances, where an
undiluted subjectivism might have countenanced another course.
Chapter 5 also presents the crime of attempted murder, on the basis of
its being an included offence to murder and therefore "of obvious
importance to the subject of this book."8 The authors discuss the
extension of the Vaillancourt"2 and Martineau83 rulings to the crime of
attempted murder, as it too is seen as a special stigma crime, requiring
subjective intention, without the attenuation of recklessness. The authors
are concerned with the exclusion of reckless attempts, citing arguments
on both sides of the issue, but supporting the extension to include
recklessness that many critics have recommended. The ensuing discus-
sion of the actus reus of attempted murder illustrates the difficulty
involved in trying to state a test of broad utilizability, touching as well on
the problems in cases involving impossible attempts. There is some brief
attention to included offences and attempts with respect to other types of
homicide.
Chapter 6 examines "an eclectic mixture of arguments that can lead to
acquittal or a reduced verdict, other than denials of the most straightfor-
ward elements of the homicide offences." 84 Provocation is analyzed first,
as "a defence steeped in sexual politics, since its users are primarily
male. ' 85 One eagerly awaits their assessment of the Supreme Court
decision in Thibert,86 which sadly seems unresponsive to their critique of
provocation. Although it is undeniable that the cases are replete with
instances of sexist and homophobic invocations of the defence, the
reviewer is unaware of any authoritative research in the Canadian context
examining national patterns of use of this defence over time. In any event,
the section clearly makes the point that "the standard of self-control and
anger itself are social constructs" and "the content of the ordinary person
test is likely to contain significant messages about the interaction of
anger/self-control and race, gender, age, etc.",8 7 noting the "increasing
recognition of the difficulties inherent in the use of an 'ordinary person'
80. Supra note 48.
81. Supra note I at 5-1.
82. Supra note 56.
83. Supra note 57.
84. Supra note I at 6-2.
85. Ibid. at 6-4.
86. R. v. Thibert, [19961 S.C.J. No.2 (Q.L.).
87. Supra note 1 at 6-11.
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test in multicultural systems of law."88 The authors offer a compelling
argument that it is "legitimate for the law to label someone a murderer for
killing his wife because she was leaving him or for killing, because of
extreme homophobia, a man perceived as gay."89 Although they consider
most of the arguments raised by the partial defence, the discussion would
have been enriched had the authors provided a section on law reform and
more particularly turned their minds to the question of whether the
defence should exist at all or whether it is merely another artifact of the
awkward distinction between intentional killers who receive the mini-
mum mandatory sentence for murder and intentional killers who benefit
from the discretionary sentencing regime of manslaughter.
In contrast, the authors present a relatively abbreviated account of a
defense of intoxication, which they are satisfied is considered compre-
hensively elsewhere.9° Although at the time of the writing of the first
edition, the landmark decision of Daviault9' had not been handed down
by the Supreme Court of Canada and the response of Parliament in the
form of Bill C-72 had not been devised, the authors are somewhat
prescient in their observation that "barriers to intoxication as a defence to
manslaughter will dissolve in due course. 9g2 In the 1995 (Release 1)
edition, the authors defend the constitutionality of Bill C-72, particularly
on the basis of the need to inform any analysis of its constitutional
implications by a consideration of the equality implications of the use of
the defence of intoxication. 93
Defence of the person is analyzed from the perspective of the doctrinal
development in Lavallje,94 rejecting any notion that Creighton95 has
eroded the applicability of the former case in the Court's "stressing the
importance of a uniform standard. '96 The authors simply argue that the
Lavalle 97 case requires the decision-maker to be informed "of the overall
context in applying" the relevant standard.98 They celebrate the "willing-
ness to take a contextual approach" 99 to self-defence and explain some of
the implications of this doctrinal accretion "with respect to the perspectives
88. Ibid. at 6-17.
89. Ibid. at 6-20.
90. Ibid. at 6-30.
91. Supra note 61.
92. Supra note I at 6-35.
93. Ibid. at 4-75.
94. Supra note 66.
95. Supra note 37.
96. Supra note I at 6-43.
97. Supra note 66.
98. Supra note I at 6-43.
99. Ibid. at 6-44.
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of members of disadvantaged groups whose experiences are unlikely to
be mirrored in those of judges and to a lesser extent juries"."° There are
also some difficult questions posed in the chapter, with respect to the
Supreme Court's rejection of "'excessive self-defence' as a device for
convicting of manslaughter rather than murder.""'' Whether the law
should impose a duty to retreat and the implications of such a require-
ment, particularly for disadvantaged groups such as battered women or
others, for whom a safe exit may be either not within the accused's
knowledge or itself contain many risks, are discussed. Some ancillary
issues are noted, such as the constitutionality of an objective test of
reasonableness and the possible alternative justifications for the use of
deadly force offered by s. 35 (where the accused was the original
aggressor), and s. 37 (the use of force to prevent an assault) and s. 27 (use
of force to prevent commission of an offence).
The presentation of the defence of duress (in the 1994 version) will be
revised in subsequent editions following the decision in Hibbert,0 2 which
responds to some of the questions that the authors raise. The case may also
demand some revision of the previous review of the duty to retreat issue
in self-defence, as the Court emphasizes the importance of the accused's
having had an opportunity to safely extricate himself or herself from the
situation of duress. The necessity defence is assessed from the perspec-
tive of whether it should be available as a defence to murder, which the
authors seem to support, at least to the point of rejecting the position of
the Law Reform Commission of Canada that necessity should be unavail-
able: "the matter should not be dealt with by a blanket rule, which could
provide an unfair contrast with duress and self-defence, but rather by an
application of general principles."'' 3 The following section, "Protection
of Persons Acting Under Authority", requires revision in light of the
passage of s. 25(4) of the Code'O° with regard to the use of deadly force
by peace officers.
The ensuing survey of the mental disorder defence is unremarkable,
although it does present its major features following the substantial
changes to the Code in 1992.105 Again, updating will be necessary to
reflect the subsequent Oommen 106 case from the Supreme Court ofCanada. Involuntariness, in the guise of non-insane automatism, is
100. Ibid. at 6-45.
101. Ibid. at 6-46.
102. R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973.
103. Supra note 1 at 6-75.
104. Supra note 48.
105. S.C. 1991,c. 43, s. 4.
106. R. v. Oommen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 507.
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presented with some concentration on the insistence of the objective test
governing psychological blow of automatism, which the authors see as
potentially giving scope to "racist, homophobic and misogynist assump-
tions", although it is noted that "there is little support for this in the case
law." 07
The concluding subsection, "Potential Defences (Consent)", reviews
some of the major issues with respect to the ability to consent to one's
death, unfortunately again written in the period prior to the release of the
Senate Report on these issues, which highlights the major policy argu-
ments inherent in changing the law with respect to assisted suicide and
euthanasia.
The final chapter, "Sentencing", starts with a short history of the
abolition of the death penalty in Canada. Although irrelevant as a current
penalty, the ugly spectre of its revival must always be considered and
some reference to developments after the 1987 vote by Parliament should
be included.
There follows an extensive discussion of the various ways in which a
killing can be elevated to being designated a first degree murder, with the
accompanying twenty-five year minimum period of ineligibility for
parole. The closing with its concerns over the excessiveness of the
penalty and the values which the first degree murder classifications
represent, presents some interesting commentary on the relevant sections
of the Code.108 However, given the courts' acceptance of the classifica-
tory scheme of Parliament, there seems to be little point in hoping that a
challenge can be based upon any of these arguments. The following
section regarding sentencing for second degree murder will require
revamping in the face of the Supreme Court's decision in Shropshire, 9
although many of the factors discussed in the book will still be relevant
to the decision to fix an extended period of parole ineligibility. The
Supreme Court has preserved the salience of the character of the offender,
the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding the commis-
sion of the offence, all factors set forth by Parliament in the text of s. 744.
The Shropshire case also discusses the assessment of future dangerous-
ness, denunciation and deterrence. Therefore, the analysis of the use of
evidence relating to mental illness, intoxication, age, criminal record,
guilty plea, status of the victim, brutality, premeditation and so on, all of
which are reviewed in the book, will still be pertinent to preparation for
a second degree murder sentencing. Where Shropshire will be of particular
107. Supra note I at 6-117.
108. Supra note 48.
109. R. v. Shropshire, [1995] S.C.J. No. 52 (Q.L.).
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relevance to the authors is in its requiring a more deferential attitude on
the part of courts of appeal in examining decisions on parole ineligibility,
which specifically reject "a standard of appellate review that was tanta-
mount to substituting its opinion for that of the trial judge."" 0
The discussion of the "reform of sentencing for the crime of murder"
reinforces the inter-relationship of substantive law and sentencing, and
repeats the point that "the sentencing scheme for murder has also
complicated the substantive law of murder in that it has led to the
development of defences aimed at avoiding the harshness of the sen-
tence".,"' However, having noted this relationship and the extensive
academic and quasi-governmental discussion of the topic, the authors
nonetheless conclude that "the mandatory life sentence for murder should
be retained", 2 as parole ineligibility reflects "our outrage at Canada's
most serious crime.""..3 This is one area where the innovative spirit of the
rest of the book seems curiously absent. Perhaps later versions will either
reflect a change in perspective or more support for their rather hard-line
position than the book currently offers. The authors do endorse the
abolition of degrees of murder, suggesting that "one crime of murder is
adequate so long as there is some flexibility in sentencing for that
crime."
'" 14
The consideration of sentencing ranges and factors in attempted
murder contains the conclusion that the case law shows that "attempting
to kill a loved one is generally seen as a mitigating factor in sentencing,
[leaving] women (and possibly children), often the victims of such
assaults, inadequately protected by the law."' '1 The authors conclude that
while guilt is largely determined based on a culpability model, "the harm
analysis has a greater role at the sentencing stage of attempted murder."
'"16
It is uncertain whether this observation will still be viable after s. 718.2
of the Code' 17 becomes effective, which contains a list of factors which
aggravate a sentence in normal circumstances, including the offence
being "motivated by bias, prejudice or hate" or the offender abusing "a
position of trust or authority in relation to the victim".11 8
110. Ibid at 17.
111. Supra note I at 7-54.
112. Ibid. at 7-55.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Supra note 1 at 7-62.
116. Ibid. at 7-64.
117. Supra note 48.
118. Act to amend the Criminal Code, S.C. 1995, c. 22, s. 6.
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The manslaughter sentencing cases are assessed, acknowledging the
discretion given to judges and the huge variation in actual sentences. The
extremes of life imprisonment and non-custodial sentences are cited first,
followed by a review of factors which might become influential in the
more typical cases. Drawing from sources such as Ruby 1 9 and Nadin-
Davis, 12 0 the authors both reveal some of the existing sub-classifications
of factors and offer a critique of some of the more troublesome ones.
The "Conclusions" are too compressed in their four pages, as they
contain a discussion of recent history and the possibilities of dramatic
changes in current trends in sentencing. Although the authors note "the
historical over-representation of the disadvantaged in the criminal justice
systems of western nations" and "a growing population of long-term
prisoners", 121 the conclusions are disappointing in their reach and sub-
stance, given the general thoroughness of this book and the obvious
breadth of knowledge of the authors. The authors recognize the conun-
drums of some of the positions enunciated in their work, with some of
their arguments leading to less punitiveness and others sounding "like a
call for more, and more finely-tuned, retribution, which fails to take into
account the brutalizing effects of lengthy imprisonment on individuals.' 22
The focus of the book is said to be "on the internal priorities and methods
of reasoning of the present law [rejecting] paralysis as an option in the
face of the social reality of homicide". 123 Although they again defend their
choices as being consistent "with a much broader search for a humane
system of criminal justice,"'' 24 little is offered by way of either methods
of understanding or proposals for achievement of such visions. An
extended conclusion, more consonant with their declared long-term
aspirations, would be desirable in a major scholarly work such as this.
Part of the influence of such works is toward changing some of the norms
of the criminal justice system and while the authors seem to accept this
challenge on an incremental basis in the midst of various chapters, a
conclusion that provides more by way of transformative ideals or aspira-
tions and recommendations would be a welcome addition.
In the final analysis, this book is of such a quality that its publication
should continue with regular updates. I suppose that this is a matter that
will ultimately be determined by its commercial success, which is not at
119. C.C. Ruby, Sentencing, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987).
120. R.P. Nadin-Davis, Sentencing in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1982).
121. Supra note t at 7-93.
122. Ibid. at 7-94.
123. Ibid..
124. Ibid. at 7-95.
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all certain. There cannot be very many practitioners who will invest in this
book, however estimable. Despite the attention of the news, the novelists
and the jurists, there are really relatively few culpable homicides in
Canada and obviously even fewer lawyers who are specialized in the area.
If the combined circulation does not justify additional editions, then this
will be very much a loss for Canadian legal scholarship. On the other
hand, the work does stand on its own as a major contribution to the
understanding of the legal response to killing in Canada.


